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Abstract—Demand-side energy management improves robust-
ness and efficiency in Smart Grids. Load-adjustment and load-
shifting are performed to match demand to available supply.
These operations come at a discomfort cost for consumers as
their lifestyle is influenced when they adjust or shift in time
their demand. Performance of demand-side energy management
mainly concerns how robustness is maximized or discomfort
is minimized. However, measuring and controlling the distri-
bution of discomfort as perceived between different consumers
provides an enriched notion of fairness in demand-side energy
management that is missing in current approaches. This paper
defines unfairness in demand-side energy management and shows
how unfairness is measurable and controllable by software
agents that plan energy demand in a decentralized fashion.
Experimental evaluation using real demand and survey data from
two operational Smart Grid projects confirms these findings.
Index Terms—unfairness, fairness, agent, planning, demand,
Smart Grid, load-adjustment, load-shifting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand-side energy management can make Smart Grids
more robust and efficient as demand-response mechanisms
are capable of preventing black-outs, increasing utilization
of renewable energy resources, reducing carbon emissions
or decreasing the electricity prices for consumers. Demand-
response mechanisms are mainly designed to maximize the
load-adjustment or load-shifting potential. However, these
mechanisms do not usually take into consideration the impact
that demand-side energy management has on the lifestyle
of consumers. Load-adjustment and load-shifting are likely
to cause discomfort, which might be not equally distributed
between consumers. This effect makes most demand-side
energy management approaches unfair, and such unfairness
may result in a lower adoption level of demand-response
programs or even in malfunctioning of electricity markets [1]
and monetary compensations [2].
This paper studies unfairness in decentralized planning of
energy demand. Unfairness is defined by the dispersion of
discomfort that consumers experience when future demand
is planned in response to a load-adjustment or load-shifting
event. Different consumers perceive discomfort in a different
way. For example, a room with low temperature does not
make all consumers feel the same cold. This paper shows
how reasoning about the discomfort perception of consumers
is possible by analyzing the answers that consumers provided
in surveys of demand-response programs. This contribution
provides a more realistic view of unfairness that is closer to
Smart Grid practice.
This paper also shows that unfairness is temporally influ-
enced and correlated to the demand level, which varies season-
ally. For example, in geographic areas that have cold winters
with higher demand than summers, unfairness is higher. This
paper also shows how unfairness is locally controllable by
tuning the process of demand planning. If the number of al-
ternative demand plans is lower in load-adjustment, unfairness
is also lower. This paper experimentally studies the aforemen-
tioned aspects using real demand data from two operational
Smart Grid projects. Given that fairness (or unfairness) is
a relatively unexplored research area in demand-side energy
management, this paper shows that unfairness is measurable
and controllable in Smart Grids, concluding that a notion of
fairness can provide a more in-depth understanding about the
performance trade-offs in demand-side energy management.
This paper is outlined as follows: Section II introduces the
context of demand planning in which unfairness is studied.
Section III motivates and defines a notion of unfairness in
demand planning. Section IV illustrates two operational Smart
grid projects from which data are used for the experimental
evaluation that follows in Section V. Section VI illustrates and
compares the notion of unfairness introduced in this paper with
related work. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. DEMAND PLANNING
Demand planning is defined in this paper as the computation
of a time series, the demand plan, with the scheduled energy
consumption of a future time period. This paper studies
demand planning at the household level, yet, this approach
can be extended to the level of a household appliance, wall
outlet or even the feeder of a neighborhood. Demand planning
can be used as a computational mechanism of demand-side
energy management services under various demand-response
programs [3]. This paper focuses on two such services that
can be used to improve the robustness and efficiency of Smart
Grids: (i) load-adjustment and (ii) load-shifting.
Load-adjustment in demand planning is defined as an over-
all increase or decrease of demand compared to an intended
demand without planning. A decrease in demand is required,
for example, if the overall capacity of supply is not adequate
to meet demand. An increase in demand is desired when there
is a high availability of renewable energy resources [4] or
when market prices are low [5]. In practice, load-adjustment
is achieved by incentive mechanisms [6] that motivate chang-
ing the comfort level of heating/cooling or switching on/off
household appliances.
Load-shifting in demand planning is defined as a change
in demand distribution compared to the one of an intended
demand without planning, yet the overall average planned
demand equals the intended one. Load-shifting often results in
peak-shaving, minimization of power oscillations or shifting of
load to low-peak hours. In practice, load-shifting is achieved
by pre-heating/cooling water heaters before peak-hours or
incentivizing consumers to change their consumption behavior,
e.g. making a shower earlier or later in time.
This paper focuses on the planning model of possible
demand plans [7] that are locally generated by software
agents (or other software components) that control a household
energy management system [8]. The possible plans represent
alternative demand plans from which an agent can choose,
according to local criteria and system objectives.
Plan selections can be local or coordinated. This paper
focuses on load-adjustment objectives under local selections:
demand is minimized by letting agents choose demand plans
with the lowest average energy consumption. This can be
achieved with a fitness function that locally minimizes energy
demand. Thus, coordination between different agents is not
required. In contrast, load-shifting objectives require coordi-
nated selections that result in desynchronizing the times during
which consumers consume energy. Such a coordination is per-
formed by EPOS, the Energy Plan Overlay Self-stabilization
system [9].
This paper adopts a data-driven approach for plan genera-
tion. Possible demand plans are locally generated by clustering
historical demand data every certain time period, e.g., every
day, for a total period of time, e.g., a week or a month. Clus-
tering is based on the computation of a proximity metric such
as the Euclidean or the Manhattan distance [10]. The number
of clusters is usually part of the clustering parameterization
and represents the number of possible plans that the agents
generate. The total period of time from which historic data is
used as input of the clustering algorithm can be defined by a
sliding clustering window. For example, the CAISO demand
forecasting methodology predicts demand based on the energy
consumption of the past 10 days [11]. The same principle can
be adopted for the generation of the possible plans for the
following day.
Each possible plan is devised by computing the represen-
tative demand time series of each cluster. More specifically,
each possible plan is the medoid of a cluster and is computed
by the median of the historical time series that belongs to this
cluster. A critical aspect in the clustering process is the number
of clusters l that corresponds to the number of possible plans.
Previous experimental work shows that a higher number of
possible plans in demand-side energy management results in
improved robustness for Smart Grids [9], [7]. A higher number
of possible plans means that the agents have a higher degree
of freedom to adjust demand according to system objectives.
However, a higher number of possible plans increases also the
computational cost1 and causes a lower cluster size on average.
A cluster with a lower size results in a devised possible plan
that is less representative of past energy consumption.
III. UNFAIRNESS UNDER DEMAND PLANNING
Planning of demand for load-adjustment and load-shifting
results in a discomfort impact for consumers. Changes are
required that affect how and when consumers use energy.
For example, load-adjustment may entail that heating tem-
perature setpoints are lower during winter times resulting in
a discomfort experience: consumers feel colder. The same
holds for load-shifting as consumers need to change the
times when they perform certain activities, e.g. running the
washing machine. Moreover, a discomfort experience depends
on human perception and therefore the discomfort impact
of load-adjustment and load-shifting is not the same among
different consumers.
Most demand-side energy management methods do not con-
sider how this discomfort is distributed among consumers. The
distribution of discomfort indicates a degree of fairness in the
sense of how ‘equally’ consumers contribute to the robustness
of Smart Grids. This paper introduces a method that quantifies
and controls unfairness of discomfort under load-adjustment
and load-shifting, even when consumers perceive discomfort
differently. Two types of discomfort are distinguished: (i)
adjustment discomfort and (ii) shifting discomfort.
Adjustment discomfort is assumed to be the discomfort ex-
perienced under load-adjustment and it is defined by summing
positive and negative errors that correspond to the distance
of the planed demand from the actual demand. Adjustment
discomfort is computed as follows:
1The increased computational cost concerns the generation process but also
the optimization performed by EPOS [9].
Ai = w
a
i
T∑
t=1
(pti − dti), (1)
where pti is the demand at time t of the selected plan with
size T generated and selected by agent i. The demand dti is
the respective intended energy consumption without demand
planning. Negative errors are perceived as negative discomfort,
or comfort, given that consumers use a higher amount of
energy resources. The weight wai ∈ [0, 1] represents the
sensitivity of a consumer i to the adjustment discomfort. A
value equals to 0 means that the consumer does not perceive
any adjustment discomfort due to demand reduction, while a
value equal to 1 means that the sensitivity of the consumer to
demand reduction is maximal.
Shifting discomfort is assumed as the discomfort experi-
enced under load-shifting and it is defined by the root mean
square deviation as follows:
Si = w
s
i
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(pti − dti)2, (2)
where pti and d
t
i are the same demand values defined for
Ai. In contrast to adjustment discomfort, shifting discomfort
measures squared errors that are always positive and capture
temporal changes in demand. As before, the weight wsi ∈ [0, 1]
represents the sensitivity of consumer i to any shifting of the
desired demand dti: the higher the value of w
s
i, the higher the
perceived discomfort.
The discomfort values between n different consumers can-
not be compared as they correspond to different demand levels.
For this reason, normalized discomfort values in the range
[0, 1] are computed as follows:
A′i =
Ai −minni (Ai)
maxni (Ai)−minni (Ai)
, (3)
S′i =
Si −minni (Si)
maxni (Si)−minni (Si)
(4)
Finally, the unfairness values UA and US are quantified by
computing the standard deviation of the normalized adjustment
and shifting discomfort values:
UA =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(A′i −A′i), (5)
US =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(S′i − S′i), (6)
where A′i and S′i are the mean of all adjustment and shifting
discomfort values.
Although the notion of fairness is relevant to other aspects
of demand-side energy management, e.g., monetary compen-
sation, this paper focuses on the novel aspect of discomfort
that is challenging to quantify. Moreover, if discomfort is
fairly distributed among consumers, this prevents situations in
which consumers may aim for themselves the full monetary
benefit [2].
IV. VALIDATION IN SMART GRID PROJECTS
The actual unfairness that consumers experience via demand
planning is validated a posteriori using real consumption data
from two operational Smart Grid projects, the Electricity Cus-
tomer Behavior Trial2 in Ireland and the Olympic Peninsula
Smart Grid Demonstration3 in the USA. The intended energy
demand dti used to compute the discomfort values is referred
to in this paper as CONTROL-DATA.
A. The Electricity Customer Behavior Trial project
This project is a cost-benefit analysis that assesses the
impact of different time-of-use tariffs on the electricity con-
sumption of Irish households and enterprises. The project ran
in the period 2009-2010 with 5000 residential and business
consumers participating. The data are cleaned from missing
values and filtered out to contain the energy consumption time
series of 782 residential consumers that belong to the control
group4.
The software agent that controls the energy management
system reasons about the number of possible plans based on
the answers provided by the human consumer to the following
two survey questions5:
Question 1. My household may decide to make minor changes
to the way we use electricity.
Question 2. My household may decide to make major changes
to the way we use electricity.
The answer aq in each of the above question q belongs to
{1, ..., 5}, where 1 stands for a strong agreement and 5 stands
for a strong disagreement. Algorithm 1 illustrates how agents
reason about the number of possible plans they generate6. Note
that the number of plans computed by this algorithm is referred
to in this paper as l = f1(z = x). The main intuition behind
the generation algorithm is the normalization of the answers
to the two questions a1, a2 in l ∈ {z − 2, ..., z + 3}. The
number of possible plans increases as consumers allow for
more major changes in the way they use electricity (lines 1-6
in Algorithm 1). The constant z is used as a scaling factor for
the number of possible plans in the generation process.
2http://www.ucd.ie/issda/data/commissionforenergyregulationcer/ (last ac-
cessed January 2014)
3https://svn.pnl.gov/olypen/ (last accessed January 2014)
4These consumers are not affected by the time-of-use tariffs applied for the
purpose of the project.
5The question block ‘55122’ of the pre-trial residential survey contains
these two questions.
6Note that from the total number of 782 residential consumers, 132 of
these do not participate in the pre-trial survey. For 116 of these consumers,
the question block ‘54132’ of the post-trial survey is used for computing
Algorithm 1. This question block is the respective post-trial question block
‘55122’ of the pre-trial survey (My household made minor/major changes to
the way we use electricity.). For the final 16 residential consumers that do
not participate in neither of the pre-trial nor post-trial surveys, the number of
possible plans is computed by the median number of possible plans in the the
rest of the 766 consumers.
Algorithm 1 Computing the number of possible plans for the
Electricity Customer Behavior Trial project.
Require: z representing a default value for l
1: if a2 = 1 then
2: l = z + 3
3: else if a2 = 2 then
4: l = z + 2
5: else if a2 = 3 then
6: l = z + 1
7: else if a2 = 4 then
8: if a1 = 3 then
9: l = z
10: else if a1 < 3 then
11: l = z + 1
12: else // a1 > 3
13: l = z − 1
14: end if
15: else if a2 = 5 then
16: if a1 = 3 then
17: l = z − 1
18: else if a1 < 3 then
19: l = z
20: else // a1 > 3
21: l = z − 2
22: end if
23: end if
Ensure: number of possible plans l for each agent
The weights of discomfort are computed by the answers of
consumers to the following two questions:
Question 3. It is too inconvenient to reduce our usage of
electricity7.
Question 4. I am interested in changing the way I use
electricity if it helps environment8.
Based on the possible answers {1, ..., 5}, where 1 stands for
a strong agreement and 5 stands for a strong disagreement,
the weights wsi and w
a
i for each agent i are computed by
normalizing the answers in the range [0, 1].
B. The Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid Demonstration project
This project assesses the adjustment of individual energy
usage based on price signals exchanged within a two-way
bidding market [12]. The project concerns the period of
March 2006 to March 2007 with 112 household participants
regionally distributed in the Olympic Peninsula of the USA.
The data subset from November 2006 to March 2007 is
selected during which the lowest number of missing values
is observed. The demand of each consumer is captured every
5 minutes. Demand data are aligned to the sampling rate of
the Electricity Customer Behavior Trial project by aggregating
7This is question ‘4352’ in the residential pre-trial survey.
8This is question ‘4331’ in the residential pre-trial survey.
12 consecutive demand bids of each hour to a single hourly
demand bid.
Demand data are filtered out to contain 29 consumers that
(i) either belong to the CONTROL group or have a FIXED type
of contract and (ii) have less than 20% of their values missing.
Two extra consumers are excluded as their demand time series
contains a large proportion of zero values. Therefore the final
number of consumers used in the evaluation is 27. The missing
values in the final consumers are interpolated by computing
the average demand values in the past and future 10 days.
In the context of this project, the demand adjustment is
achieved by dynamically modifying the temperature setpoints
of various household devices. Motivated by this approach, the
number of possible plans l = f2(z = x) is defined by a
function that captures the selected temperature setpoints of
consumers during project runtime. More specifically, the range
of minimum and maximum temperature setpoints selected is
normalized to l ∈ {z, ..., z + 4} for a given constant z.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section experimentally evaluates unfairness under de-
mand planning in the two Smart Grids projects illustrated
in Section IV. It also shows how a global metric such as
unfairness can be locally controlled by the number of plans
that agents generate.
The possible plans available to the agents are generated
by clustering the energy consumption time series of the 10
most recent days that is the length of the sliding clustering
window. The number of plans is selected according to two
different criteria: (i) by assigning a default number of plans to
each agent and (ii) by computing the number of possible plans
based on project data. In the first case, the minimum number of
l = 2 is selected. This number minimizes the computational
cost in each agent9. In the second case, the agents reason
about the consumer preferences collected by each project, e.g.,
survey answers and temperature setpoints. Load-adjustment
and load-shifting are performed on a random day of each
week, simulating in this way a demand-response event. An
implementation of the hierarchical clustering algorithm [13] in
Weka10 is used for generating the possible plans11 of the agents
with the value of z = 2. Figure 1 illustrates the normalized
histogram of the number of possible plans l in the two Smart
Grid projects. Figure 2 illustrates the normalized histogram of
the two discomfort weights, computed from the answers of
consumers in Question 3 and 4.
Given that load-shifting requires coordinated plan selections
as illustrated in Section II, an implementation of EPOS in the
Protopeer [14] toolkit is used for this purpose. EPOS coor-
dinates demand by letting agents interact over self-organized
tree topologies [15]. For the same tree topology, 10 instances
are generated, in each of which the agents are positioned
9Unfairness is also minimized as shown in this paper.
10http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ (last accessed September 2013)
11Note that if l ≤ 1, then an agent selects the median time series from the
sliding clustering window
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Behavior Trial project.
randomly, so as to eliminate possible bias introduced by a
certain topological positioning of the agents.
A. Temporal Influence
Figure 3 illustrates unfairness when load-adjustment is
performed. For the Electricity Customer Behavior Trial project
in Figure 3a, a temporal influence is observed. During winter
time, unfairness increases, while during summer time (July
and August), unfairness is minimal. Figure 4b does not show a
clear temporal influence. A possible explanation is that for this
Smart Grid project a significantly lower number of consumers
is available, whose energy consumption data spans over a
shorter time range (from November to March) that does not
reach summer time.
Figure 4 illustrates unfairness when load-shifting is per-
formed. The same temporal pattern is observed in Figure 4a
as in Figure 3a. Unfairness in demand planning is higher in
winter time than in summer time. Figure 4b shows lower
unfairness in November than in the rest of the winter days.
In order to understand these temporal patterns, the total
demand from CONTROL-DATA for the two Smart grid projects
is plotted in Figure 5. The total demand of Irish households
is higher in winter than in summer. The same holds for
the households of Olympic Peninsula that reach the highest
demand on December and January.
Note that there is a strong correlation between the unfair-
ness and the total demand for both Smart Grid projects as
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(a) Electricity Customer Behavior
Trial project.
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(b) Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid
Demonstration project.
Fig. 3. The values of adjustment discomfort under load-adjustment for each
agent (dots with values on the right Y axis). Their dispersion shows the
unfairness for the two Smart Grid projects (line with values on the left Y
axis).
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(b) Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid
Demonstration project.
Fig. 4. The values of shifting discomfort under load-shifting for each agent
(dots with values on the right Y axis). Their dispersion shows the unfairness
for the two Smart Grid projects (line with values on the left Y axis).
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Fig. 5. The total demand from CONTROL-DATA for the two Smart Grid
projects.
illustrated in Table I. The Pearson correlation coefficient is
always positive for both load-adjustment and load-shifting. For
example, the correlation coefficient is 0.92 between unfairness
(Figure 4a) and the total demand (Figure 5a) under load-
shifting. The low but positive correlation of 0.15 under load-
shifting in the Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid Demonstration
project is explained by the low number of consumers that
participate in demand planning.
TABLE I
THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN UNFAIRNESS AND THE
TOTAL DEMAND FROM CONTROL-DATA.
Load-adjustment Load-shifting
Electricity Customer Behavior Trial 0.80 0.92
Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid
Demonstration
0.82 0.15
The positive correlation values show that a temporal influ-
ence of unfairness comes from the fact that weather influ-
ences the demand level of consumers. If demand is higher
under load-adjustment and load-shifting, a higher unfairness
becomes more probable in the discomfort that consumers
experience.
B. Control of Unfairness
Albeit unfairness is a global metric, it can be locally
controlled by influencing the number of possible plans that the
agents generate. This section studies the effect that the number
of possible plans have in unfairness. For this purpose, agents
are grouped according to the number of plans they generate
as shown in Figure 1. Given that the values of unfairness are
normalized as shown in Equation (3) and (4), the two groups
are compared in Figure 6 and 7 under load-adjustment. In both
figures, unfairness increases as the number of plans increases.
201
0-0
1-0
9  
201
0-0
3-1
7  
201
0-0
5-2
8  
201
0-0
8-0
6  
201
0-1
0-1
4  
201
0-1
2-2
2  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Un
fa
irn
es
s
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
No
rm
ali
se
d 
ad
jus
tm
en
t d
isc
om
fo
rt
(a) l = 2.
201
0-0
1-0
9  
201
0-0
3-1
7  
201
0-0
5-2
8  
201
0-0
8-0
6  
201
0-1
0-1
4  
201
0-1
2-2
2  
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Un
fa
irn
es
s
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
No
rm
ali
se
d 
ad
jus
tm
en
t d
isc
om
fo
rt
(b) l = 4
Fig. 6. The values of adjustment discomfort under load-adjustment for agents
with different number of possible plans l (dots with values on the right Y axis).
Their dispersion shows the unfairness for the Electricity Customer Behavior
Trial project (line with values on the left Y axis).
More specifically, unfairness increases 53.4% on average
when the number of possible plans increases from 2 to 4 for
the Electricity Customer Behavior Trial project. The respective
increase is 39.0% on average for the Olympic Peninsula Smart
Grid Demonstration project.
The unfairness for different number of possible plans under
load-shifting is 2.9% higher on average for the Electricity Cus-
tomer Behavior Trial project. This increase does not indicate
a clear influence as it is significantly lower than the one in
load-adjustment.
Unfairness is not the only factor that is influenced by the
number of possible plans that agents generate. Earlier work
shows that a higher number of possible plans increases the
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Fig. 7. The values of adjustment discomfort under load-adjustment for agents
with different number of possible plans l (dots with values on the right Y axis).
Their dispersion shows the unfairness for the Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid
Demonstration project (line with values on the left Y axis).
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Fig. 8. Average daily energy demand for the two Smart Grid projects.
potential of stabilizing energy consumption, since the agents
have a higher degree of freedom to make choices that match
system-wide objectives [7]. Figure 9 and 10 show the different
demand curves achieved in groups of consumers whose agents
generate different number of possible plans. Figure 8 shows
the respective curves for the total number of agents.
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Fig. 9. Average daily energy demand of agents with different number of
possible plans l for the Electricity Customer Behavior Trial project.
The average daily demand curves show that as the num-
ber of possible plans increases, the load-adjustment and
load-shifting demand curves differ to a higher extent from
CONTROL-DATA. In practice, the morning and evening power
peaks under load-adjustment experience a more significant
reduction with l = 4 than with l = 2 in both Smart Grid
projects. Under load-shifting, a higher demand increase is
observed during low-peak times as l increases, for example,
the early morning times in both Smart Grid projects.
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Fig. 10. Average daily energy demand of agents with different number of
possible plans l for the Olympic Peninsula Smart Grid Demonstration project.
These demand curves indicate that a more effective load-
adjustment and load-shifting is ensured by consumers with a
higher number of possible plans, who also experience a higher
discomfort, causing in this way higher unfairness at a global
level.
C. Summary of findings
The following findings summarize the experimental evalu-
ation of this section:
1) Unfairness in demand planning is temporally influenced.
For example, unfairness is higher in winter than in
summer.
2) The temporal influence of unfairness in demand planning
is correlated to the different demand levels observed
during the year.
3) Unfairness in demand planning is locally controllable by
the number of possible plans that the agents generate:
the lower the number of possible plans, the lower the
unfairness.
4) A more effective load-adjustment and load-shifting re-
sults in a higher unfairness in demand-planning.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
Fairness (or unfairness) in demand-side energy management
is a relatively unexplored research area. This section outlines
the most relevant work that is related to this paper.
Stadler et al. argue that communication protocols are a
key aspect of a market-based demand-side ancillary service to
ensure fairness [1]. If, for example, a request for load shedding
is small enough to be fulfilled by a single participant in the
ancillary service market, it might be that the fastest participant
to retrieve the request always wins the monetary incentive
attached to it. With a well-designed communication protocol,
load shedding requests can be delivered to all the participants
at the same time, or alternatively in a round-robin fashion, to
ensure that all participants have their turn [3].
It is shown that billing mechanisms can be designed to be
fair in autonomous demand-response mechanisms [2]. Fairness
is achieved by rewarding consumers according to their con-
tributions to meet system-wide objectives. In contrast to this
approach, the concept of unfairness introduced in this paper
focuses on how discomfort is distributed among consumers.
Moreover, the authors of [2] do not focus on the factors
that affect fairness and how fairness can be controlled by the
system designer.
A fair allocation of power to air-conditioners is introduced
in [16]. Two notions of fairness are studied, (i) the min-max
fairness that concerns the lowest temperature that consumers
can have and (ii) the proportional fairness that deals with the
fraction of requested cooling that each consumer has. Fairness
is controlled in a centralized fashion by utility companies, in
contrast to this work that introduces a local control of fairness
by adjusting the number of possible plans that agents generate.
A similar centralized optimization approach for fairness and
discomfort is introduced by [17], in which two scheduling
algorithms are proposed: (i) highest power next and (ii) round
robin. Discomfort is monitored according to the duration in
which room temperatures deviate from the desired temper-
ature, whereas this paper evaluates discomfort a posteriori,
using real datasets from two operational Smart Grid projects.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper concludes that unfairness in the distribution
of discomfort between consumers is measurable and con-
trollable in decentralized planning of energy demand. This
paper shows how reasoning about the perception of consumers
in discomfort is possible. It also shows that unfairness is
temporally influenced given the correlation of unfairness with
different seasonal demand levels observed in real demand
data. When load-adjustment and load-shifting become more
effective, unfairness increases. This observation shows a per-
formance trade-off in the design of demand-response programs
that provides a more in-depth understanding about the role of
consumers in demand-side energy management. The findings
of this paper can be used to improve and motivate a broader
adoption of fair demand-respond programs in Smart Grids.
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